

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Public Affairs: An Effective Weapon in the Operational Commander's
Arsenal

by

Anthony Cooper
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in
partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint
Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are
not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of
the Navy.

Signature: Anthony Cooper

13 June 1997

Paper directed by
Captain George W. Jackson, USN
Chairman, Department of
Joint Military Operations

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19970520 121

Jack Gallant
Faculty Advisor Date
Captain Jack Gallant, USNR, NWC PAO



1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Public Affairs: An Effective ^{WEAPON} Tool in the Operational Commander's Arsenal (U)			
9. Personal Authors: LCDR Anthony Cooper, USN			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 7 Feb 1997	
12. Page Count: 30			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Public Affairs is a force multiplier that profoundly affects operations.			
15. Abstract: (SEE ATTACHED)			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

ABSTRACT

PUBLIC AFFAIRS: AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON IN THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER'S ARSENAL

In today's high tech environment, information is power. A retrospective examination of the military-media relationship and its affect on today's attitudes. Technological advances have brought real-time information flow to the American public virtually placing them on the battlefield. Military commanders realized the influence of Public Affairs and its position as a force multiplier. Looking at past case studies, this paper discusses how the military and media attitudes towards one another have become such. Additionally, it discusses the Public Affairs role in maintaining the support of the American public for military operations, Public Affairs use in operational deception and intelligence gathering.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
I INTRODUCTION	1
II BACKGROUND	3
Evolution of Public Affairs in Past Missions	3
Today's Military View of Public Affairs.	7
III JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB)	10
JIB Establishment	10
Manning Considerations	10
Planning Considerations.	12
Resources	15
Integration with the Joint Task Force (JTF) Staff	15
Media Handling.	16
IV PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTRIBUTIONS.	17
Force Multiplier	17
Maintaining National Will/Support	18
Public Affairs Use in Operational Deception	19
Intelligence Gathering	20
V CONCLUSION	22
APPENDIX I--JIB ORGANIZATION AND EuCom PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATION <i>PROVIDE HOPE</i>	23
NOTES	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY	26

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

They encumber our transports, occupy staterooms to the exclusion of officers on duty, they eat our provisions, swell the crowds of hangers on and increase our impedimenta. They publish without stint positive information of movements past and prospective, organizations, names of commanders, and accurate information which reaches the enemy with as much regularity as it does our People.

General William Tecumseh Sherman

After *Desert Storm* who could not be moved by the sight of that poor demoralized rabble--outwitted, outflanked, outmaneuvered by the U.S. military. But, I think given time, the press will bounce back.

Former Secretary of State James Baker

These two quotes offer decidedly different viewpoints on the media's interaction with the military, particularly during its operations. Ironically, the history that has taken place between these quotes has shaped the present day thought pattern on military-media relations. It is a relationship that is founded on opposites. The Fourth Estate strives to fulfill its mission of keeping the American people informed of its military and their operations. The military, throughout its ever expanding missions, strives not to keep the American people uninformed, but understandably remain steadfast on degree of media access because of operational security. But, how much of the military's unwillingness towards the media is operational security and how much is an institutional mindset from the past. Examination of past military-media relations reveal the roller coaster relationship and perhaps some of the reason for it. From full and complete censorship to irresponsible and false news reporting, the military and the media have been embarked on a whirlwind odyssey of converging causes; to serve the American public in their respective roles.

Because of the tremendous advances in technology, military Public Affairs has leaped into the forefront of military operations. Real-time transmissions of news has placed the American public on the battlefield. The role, and more importantly the influence, of Public Affairs on military operations, now gives the operational commander a significant weapon for public support of his mission, use in operational deception plans, intelligence gathering and as a general force multiplier. Fundamental to the success of the Public Affairs campaign is the establishment of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) as a focal point for media interaction and inclusion of the Public Affairs strategy in operational planning.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

Evolution of the Media in past operations

The military and the media share a long and sometimes sordid past on coverage of military operations. The relationship has continually moved from extremes ends of the spectrum between full disclosure and full censorship. Despite various attempts by both parties to reach a satisfactory compromise, the debate on media access to military operations continues today. The Revolutionary War posed few problems to military-media relations because of a combination of few reporters, few newspapers and the slow transmission of news itself. The War of 1812, and the Mexican War found themselves with more newspapers and reporters, but no effective method of covering the war or transmitting stories from the front. The Civil War brought on the use of censorship by the military of both the North and South due to the impact of the telegraph and railroad network. With these significant advancements in the ability to transmit news, the media became a more prolific player in warfare. However, dislike and mistrust of the media was so high they were barred from some operations and the relationship was further strained as news that was eventually published proved detrimental to the operational security. As the U.S. entered the Spanish-American War reporters were looked upon as a nuisance to the military leaders partially because the media realized that the U.S. was unprepared for a large scale war and did not hesitate to report it as such.

Censorship was the mode of operation during World War I and while not particularly successful it was offset by the patriotism of the media. The media was reluctant to reveal bad news concerning the war effort to the

public. Capitalizing on this, U.S. leaders imposed successful total censorship of the media during World War II. This successful censorship campaign was surprising considering World War II was the first war to be covered "live," not by television, but on radio.¹ The continued patriotism of the reporters and their complete freedom of movement and access to military commanders helped to quell the complaints of censorship. Censorship essentially became the accepted compromise between the military and the media until the end of the Korean War.

However, monumental changes occurred in the media which drastically affected its relationship with the military. The media experienced tremendous growth in the late 1950s, and early 1960s, and television matured into a dominant force. Communications technology made great advances that in turn increased news gathering capabilities. These strides caused the media to grow increasingly reluctant to the idea of censorship. Coinciding with these changes was the Vietnam War, which would become one of the two most significant events that would shape military-media relationships. Television was now able to bring the war to the dinner table each night. Additionally, the Vietnam War ushered in an era of mistrust among the reporters. Allegations of being purposely misled by the American officials was voiced by both the field press corps in Saigon and Pentagon reporters. In some instances, the media's complaints were merited. This eventually led to biased and sometimes factually incorrect reporting. As expected these unfavorable stories resulted in an increased distrust and dislike of the media by the military. A gap between the military and the media formed and, as the war progressed, grew increasingly wider. Contributing to this adversarial relationship was the inexperience and ignorance of the field reporter which often led to

inaccurate or negatively slanted coverage. Some reporters "editorialized" rather than reported news on the belief the American people were incapable of understanding the facts of the Vietnam War while others, on a quest for personal fame, filed stories with no regard for validity or accuracy. Ironically post-Vietnam War studies show that not all coverage was negative. In fact, analyses has shown a majority of the coverage was either favorable or neutral.² In an attempt to appease both sides, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) developed ground rules outlining essential information that was forbidden to be reported. The system worked well with few media accreditation revocations and only two violations which compromised operational security and placed troops in danger.

The antagonistic relationship continued after Vietnam until the Grenada operation in 1983, which was to be the second major event to shape the military-media relationship. The media was excluded from Grenada during the first two days of the operation, and by the third day only a small press pool was allowed in the operating area. Interestingly enough public opinion polls supported the press exclusion partly because of past negative stories. However, after Grenada, U.S. Army General John W. Vesey Jr., then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), convened a panel of newsmen and Public Affairs and operations officers in February of 1984. The panel, headed by retired U.S. Army Major General Winant Sidle, examined both media and military concerns and was to make recommendations on future media handling. Carrying the most impact was the recommendation for use of press pools.

Conceptually, the press pools were to be used in military situations where unlimited media access was not feasible. The pools, composed of

various representatives of media (wire services, television, print and radio) would make all material gathered available to non-pool members. DoD would select agencies who in turn would select their respective reporters. Shortly before an operation, the pool would be notified, transported on scene, receive an operation's brief and assigned an escort to facilitate coverage. Meals, billeting, as well as transmission means back to their home offices would be provided to the media. Following the Sidle Panel recommendation, DoD developed the National Media Pool (NMP) in 1984. The pool was exercised during several actual military operations. Most notably were the Persian Gulf *Ernest Will* tanker reflagging operations in 1987, and Operation *Just Cause* in Panama in 1989. .

Simultaneously, DoD re-examined the issue of censorship since it had worked well up to the Vietnam War. Because of censorship's inability to work during the Vietnam War, DoD had abandoned this concept and disbanded the Army's Field Press Censorship reserve units in 1977. Re-examination revealed that censorship was no longer an acceptable option and following the Sidle's panel recommendation, adopted the ground rules system for future military operations.

Desert Shield provided the first real opportunity for press pool implementation and a 17-person NMP accompanied the initial troops into Saudi Arabia in early August 1990. The system worked well, but was eventually shut down after two weeks because of the increasing tempo of operations and the large number of non-pool media who began to arrive. In order to handle the inordinate amount of reporters on the scene (1,600) DoD formed a series of smaller pools to cover operations which allowed for almost 200 reporters to be in the field by February of 1991.

The advances in media technology have paralleled the number of media covering military operations. In World War II, there were 461 accredited reporters; Vietnam rallied between 400-600 reporters in the field between 1967-1969. Approximately 700 reporters arrived in Barbados, West Indies, to cover the Grenada operation, and *Desert Shield/Storm* yielded an astounding 1,600 correspondents by the war's end.

Today's military view of the Media.

"It is not that Marines love the press -- we just regard them as an environmental feature of the battlefield, kind of like rain. If it rains you get wet."³

This view of the media as a necessary evil in war is shared by many of today's military. However, there is still an air of mistrust among the military of the media. This prevailing attitude of "us" against "them" is partially derived from today's very senior military personnel and their experience in Vietnam. As the teachers of today's young military minds, they have passed on the sense that the military is only reported on when it does something wrong. Major General Sidle recalls a cable sent by a major television network to its Saigon bureau chief in the 1966-1967 period which adds some validity to this argument. The cable read "when the Army does something well, it is not news. It is expected. So, concentrate on when the Army is doing something wrong. That's news."⁴ While the cable is dated, this perception is not. Research suggests that the cause of some of this animosity towards the media is due to their lack of a basic understanding of the military, their personnel and the concern for operational security. While the military has been willing to educate and

acquaint reporters with its world, the media has often seen no value in developing reporters with military expertise. Networks and print media lack the organizational depth to cover large scale war and instead rely on the services of retired senior officers and civilian think tank specialists in times of crisis. This void has led to thoughtless ideas by influential members of the media. Former NBC News president Michael Gartner penned a now famous *Wall Street Journal* Op-ed piece during the start of Operation *Desert Shield* in which he compared ground rules to censorship and expressed disbelief the military would not reveal such vital information as the exact number of troops, the number and types of equipment they have, their location and information concerning future operations. As Stephen Aubin writes "that the head of a major network news operation lacked such basic understanding of war coverage is something the military ought to be concerned about."⁵ *Defense Beat* reporter Fred Reed offers this scathing description of his colleagues; "they are technically illiterate and intellectually lazy. In other words, they lack the expertise needed not only to do their jobs, but also to appreciate their changing role in warfare."⁶

Another prevailing attitude of the military is that the media should be used as a propaganda tool to further an operation's effort. A 1995 Freedom Forum survey of 935 officers revealed that 60 percent believed the military should be allowed to use the media to deceive the enemy even if it meant deceiving the American public.⁷ Further study shows that today's military professional does have a profound respect for the media. Many feel the press is just as necessary in maintaining U.S. freedom as the military. In fact, the Freedom Forum survey revealed that military officers feel the media should be granted full access to the war and report without

censorship provided it is in accordance with published guidelines. Despite some institutional prejudices, today's military realizes the role , and more importantly, the impact of media on operations, as well as the need for the American people to be fully informed. Surprisingly, the survey lastly shows that the military and the media share similar views on issues such as operational security, degrees of access and ethics. The bottom line is that despite similarities in views between both organizations, there is still room for improvement. The military credo of "duty, honor, country and hate the media" as well as the archaic media view of the military as "trigger-happy hawks with something to hide" must be eclipsed as each organization retains a deep responsibility to do its job for the American people.

CHAPTER III

JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB)

Joint Information Bureau (JIB) Establishment

Critical to the operational commander, and more directly his Public Affairs Officer (PAO), is the establishment of a Joint Information Bureau, or JIB. The JIB forms the infrastructure from which Public Affairs will work all aspects of the news media in a joint or multinational operation. As the focal point, the JIB provides the necessary equipment, transportation and communications assets to support the Public Affairs staff and media coverage efforts. For maximum effectiveness and because of the expedient nature in which news occurs, the JIB is almost always co-located with the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. If operations and news media are dispersed over a large geographical area, sub-JIBS should be established.

In the role of advising the JTF commander, the JIB is a vital asset in developing themes and communication points that remain consistent with the Defense and State Departments' policy.

Manning Considerations

In order to be an effective tool for the JTF commander, the JIB should be functionally organized to relay their story and mission to the maximum extent possible. Public Affairs should plan for a rapid expansion of its staff to meet the rising challenge of the mission especially in the early stages of deployment. The staff's senior personnel should arrive simultaneously with JTF staff personnel for full integration. While the senior personnel will form the core of the JIB operation, reinforcements must be a high priority. Manning of JIB personnel can be accomplished by Active Duty, National Guard and reserve Public Affairs (PA) units. Specific crucial skill capabilities, positions and requirements should be identified in advance to support

operations plans. JIB directors can additionally request individual Public Affairs personnel from supporting combatant commanders. The number of actual JIB personnel will be dependent upon the scope of the operation. During the first four months of JIB operations in Dhahran, the JIB consisted of 34 military personnel, 17 of whom were escort officers. The JIB grew to nearly 50 Public Affairs officers and administrative support personnel by the war's end.⁸

Regardless of size, there are still key players within every JIB operation playing critical roles for the joint operation's success. Specifically there is the:

JIB Director- coordinates all activities conducted in support of the media relations' missions.

Deputy JIB Director- manages the myriad of tasks in support of the JIB and joint operation.

JIB Operations Officer- central cog in the JIB operation. Oversees daily operations of the JIB, military-media communications and assessment of published media products. Additionally, they will establish liaison with operational staff to ensure the JIB is kept constantly aware of the operational situation.

JIB Administrative Officer- provides broad administrative support for the JIB staff to include communications and logistics needs.

Media Relations Branch- primary point of contact with the media. As the JIB's "first team" for communicating operational themes, personnel assigned must be fully knowledgeable of all aspects of the JTF operation and mission.

Media Support Branch- coordination arm of the JIB. Responsible for accreditation of media and coverage coordination to include key operational events, embarkations and unit visits to the field. Liaisons Cells- provide liaison with key members of the JTF staff. The liaison cells will be examined further in the section detailing integration with the JTF staff.

Appendix A offers a wiring diagram of the JIB organization and the European Command public affairs' JIB organization for Operation *Provide Hope*.

Planning Considerations

"Failing to plan is planning to fail."

Anonymous

Never has this axiom been more true than in the joint Public Affairs environment. While there are many instructions and directives which offer guidance on Public Affairs policy, planning for the Public Affairs effort should match every phase of the operational plan. In fact, the Public Affairs portion should be developed simultaneously with the operations plan so that all logistics requirements can be figured into the total resource requirements. PA personnel should develop Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) for DoD approval. PAG strengthens the unity of effort for operations because it establishes a clear set of facts and tenets that are specific to the operation. Conforming to operational security and privacy requirements, PAG serves as a source document from which all levels (tactical, operational and strategic) can respond to the news media.

Coordination between Public Affairs, Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) must be done early in the planning phase. Although each message is different and focused on a specific

audience, information can overlap between the audiences and therefore must not contradict one another, or credibility for all three will be lost. Public Affairs must remain separate and not engage in Psychological Operations. Supportively, psychological operations should not address media unless in direct response to coverage of psychological operations functions.

There are a number of other key planning considerations that must be addressed to ensure an effective JIB operation:

News Media Access- JTF commanders must understand that media will want access beyond the JIB and thus planning must include details for accommodating and supporting media when embarked on, or deployed with the joint force. Unit security concerns must be well-thought out in determining degree of media access.

Security- decisions on information release must be carefully studied and ground rules established for the temporary delay of potentially sensitive information. While security review may become necessary in certain instances, the practice of security at the source is the prime directive in discussions with the media.

Media Pools- logistics and communications requirements to support the gathering and filing of stories by members of the pool.

Combat Camera (COMCAM)- Combat Camera brings an invaluable asset to the JIB. While Combat Camera is controlled operationally by JTF Operations (J-3) and supports the entire operation, prior planning can allow for Public Affairs imagery needs to be identified and phased into Combat Camera's mission. This is vital since COMCAM teams are often granted access to events and areas

unavailable to news media. Once cleared for security, these COMCAM products can be available for Public Affairs distribution to news agencies. Captain Gordon Peterson, former director for Public Affairs, U.S. European Command, relays that today's JTF commanders and JIB personnel must have an appreciation for Combat Camera capabilities and contributions to the overall objectives. For example, during Exercise *Bright Star* '82 in Egypt, the Rapid Deployment Force JTF (Central Command's [CENTCOM] predecessor), broke new ground by relying upon video news releases of information and still photography as the primary media for the release of information--and captured 30 minutes of satellite news coverage of the exercise on U.S. television networks.⁹

Command Information (CI)- This arm of the PA program provides timely and accurate information to the internal audience of active duty, reserve and guard members, civilian employees, retirees and most importantly the military families.

Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)- supports the command information program by providing information and entertainment programming through radio and television.

Providing the JTF commander the opportunity to communicate directly with the troops, AFRTS is a valuable asset in maintaining and enhancing unit morale, welfare and well-being.

Exercises- full Public Affairs participation should be included in all exercises. The team should train in the manner they will be expected to execute vis-à-vis placed in stressful situations and exercised in all aspects from coordination with the JTF staff,

resources requirements for Public Affairs functions, to identification and resolution of operational security concerns. Public Affairs staffs, and consequently the JTF commander, will reap better benefits if the PA activities are scenario-driven from the operation plan rather than dependent on a separate Public Affairs "to do" list.

Resources

Joint Public Affairs activities require personnel, facilities for the JIB and equipment provided on a dedicated basis to be a fully effective force in the operational arena. Arriving news media will be outfitted with the most modern and efficient equipment available so efforts must be made to outfit the JIB with comparable equipment to the extent possible. Resource requirements for JIB operations are provided from different sources (service components of the supported combatant commander, military departments and supporting combatant commanders), so the planning process must specifically identify not only requirements, but who will provide them.

Integration with the JTF Staff

In order to be effective, and of maximum use to the operation, PA personnel must be fully integrated in all staff planning. A fully involved and knowledgeable PA staff is better prepared to advise commanders and anticipate potential media "hot spots." Maintaining situational awareness is critical to the Public Affairs program and requires liaison between the JIB and key players on the JTF staff such as the Operations Officer (J-3), the Intelligence Officer (J-2) and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). To what degree will liaison extend? Where exactly will personnel be placed? The answer to these questions will be scenario-driven. Some

JIBs will establish liaison cells within the JIB which contain component command personnel representing their service or functional component command. During Operation *Restore Hope*, the JIB assigned a JIB representative to the Joint Operations Center (JOC) at JTF headquarters close to the J-3 watchstation.¹⁰ The degree of integration will be mission dependent and will invariably provide immeasurable benefits in responding to the changing situation of the operation, as well as fortify the unity of effort.

Media Handling

The first line of "offense" for the JIB are the media escorts. There is no specific requirement for trained PA personnel, but escorts should be knowledgeable command members trained in media relations. Serving as facilitators to the media, the escorts walk the fine line of not interfering with the news gathering process or inhibiting interaction with all military personnel and simultaneously ensuring media access remains within the established security and operational restrictions. Escorts must be intimately aware of classification criteria for release and non-release of information. When security concerns are pointed out to the journalist, the story is authorized immediate release if necessary changes are made. If not, the copy is transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for resolution with the appropriate news service bureau chief and eventual release.¹¹

CHAPTER IV

PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTRIBUTIONS

"From their inception, contingency operations are high visibility. The American/world politics, families of service members, the news media and the government have an insatiable demand for information that must be made readily and immediately available."

Joint Universal Lessons Learned
No. 70344-88264 (06186)

Public Affairs as a Force Multiplier

The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations states it clearly and succinctly; the PAO should be viewed as a force multiplier and be part of operational planning. Past successes have shown how an effective and potent Public Affairs campaign can provide multiple benefits. Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* prominently and frequently featured the Marines from I MEF on all major news networks, covers of major magazines and on the front pages of newspapers across America. To the unsophisticated eye, the U.S. Marine Corps single-handedly won the war. While we know that to be untrue, this demonstrates the explosive effect a proactive Public Affairs program can yield.

Media coverage heightened public appreciation for the military during Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* which in turn became a force multiplier that kept focused determination on the mission and proved effective against enemy propaganda.

Haiti offers another example of the media's far reaching influence and projection of military forces. General Colin L. Powell, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and part of a Haiti negotiating team headed by former President Jimmy Carter, relays this story:

...then suddenly the door broke open and General Biamby (Haiti's chief of staff of the army, came back in...he was livid. And he came right up to me and he said, 'General, how would you feel if you were in my position. I now know what's happening. Look on CNN. Look on that television. All of the officials in Washington are condemning us, threatening us with invasion, talking about war, talking about killing. And you sit here talking about peace and reconciliation, and now I have just gotten a call from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, and I know that the paratroopers are on the way...And within the next hour, we had a deal.¹²

More importantly, Public Affairs enhances morale by keeping families informed on troop activities, as well as developing and maintaining public awareness and support for the mission.

Maintaining National Will/Support for the Mission

In Clausewitz's trinity, he writes of the importance of the government, military and people in balanced support of one another for a country to conduct war.¹³ Today, this remains more true than ever. Military leaders realize that the media is the vehicle through which this support from the people must be cultivated and maintained. Vietnam stands as a symbol of how the media can erode public support and alter operational plans. The American victory during the Tet Offensive was grossly misinterpreted to the extent it was viewed as a defeat and became the turning point for the decline in public support and eventual U.S. withdrawal. The images of the starving Somalians drove public sympathy for U.S. intervention of the humanitarian cause. Adversely, it was the images of dead American servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu that invariably prompted the its withdrawal.

These examples show that public support is vital to the mission and the operational commander gains and maintains that support by showing America what the JTF is accomplishing. The only way to show the American people is through the news media. LTGEN Walter E. Boomer, former Commanding General of the I MEF during *Desert Shield/Storm* concedes it is not an easy task. It requires extensive logistic support, presents

potential threats to operational security and sometimes just plain gets in the way during training. However, the Marines realized that by telling its story to an audience hungry for news from the front, helped to maintain the support of the American people.¹⁴

In his paper, "Operational Synchronization," Professor Milan Vego discusses how operational plans can be stopped before their full operational impact can be felt because of the enormous influence of the media and public opinion.¹⁵

Public Affairs Use in Operational Deception

The advent and rapid advancement of computer technology and communications equipment has catapulted the arena of Information Warfare into the forefront of operations. Within the scope of Information Warfare rests operational deception. Few will dispute the intrinsic value of operational deception as it attempts to deceive the enemy of our true plans. However, does inclusion of Public Affairs in the operational deception constitute intentional deceit of the media? Some contend that operational deception has already been successfully employed with no attempts to intentionally deceive the press. History reveals the use of the press for deception during the Civil War when confederate generals planted false stories of exaggerated troop strength and strategies. While our Civil War military forefathers deliberately falsified news, our recent military leaders recognize the potential the media has to disseminate information and deceive the enemy, but simultaneously realize they cannot outright lie to the media. During Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* military leaders exercised a successful operational deception plan. As CNN analysts predicted that General Norman Schwarzkopf would attempt some deception of the enemy, he denied media access to combat ground

assembly areas prior to the beginning of the ground combat phase. Simultaneously, he did not discourage extensive coverage of Marine amphibious operations, which fueled speculations of an east to west envelopment across the beaches of eastern Kuwait. Television's coverage of the assault buildup contributed significantly to "hooking" Saddam Hussein on an amphibious landing while coalition troops executed a massive envelopment towards the north and east. Despite criticisms of deliberate deception by press professionals, General Schwarzkopf remains adamant; "I will swear on a stack of Bibles that we never, ever deliberately manipulated the press and we never, ever deliberately planted a false story."¹⁶

While we would not consciously mislead the media, the operational commander can strongly emphasize or stress particular portions of the operation plan that, if properly covered, can cause the enemy to believe we will act contrary to our true intentions.

Intelligence Gathering

In its continuing efforts to push the envelope of news reporting to real time, the media have become a valuable intelligence gathering source. Whether it be military analysts predicting operations based upon "inside sources," or Iraqi Rocket Forces using CNN to target their SCUD attacks into Israel and Saudi Arabia, the media has unknowingly been drafted into Information Warfare providing intelligence data to both sides. Colonel Alan Campen, in an essay entitled "Information, Truth and War," notes Television reporters have become a critical instrument in a totally new kind of warfare. Satellite technology...can transform reporters from dispassionate observers to unwitting, even unwilling, but nonetheless direct participants."¹⁷

In his essay entitled "Operational Leadership," Professor Vego discusses support of the C2 function requiring commanders and planners to receive and pass information from sources that are grouped in three categories: friendly, adversary and neutral. Although a neutral party, the media has access to and reports information that is valuable to the operational commander. Additionally, Vego discusses the operational commander determining the information infrastructure of the area they are operating in. In that determination, he should anticipate the enemy will try to use existing regional capabilities such as radio and television to obtain an information advantage over friendly forces.

CHAPTER V


CONCLUSION

Today's relationship between the military and the media has taken a tenuous road to the present. Riddled with mistrust and sometimes outright deceit, it has nonetheless endured as each party strives to serve the American public. Real-time transmission of news makes the media a player of considerable influence to the operational commander. This real-time capability is a prime influencer of public opinion and the operational commander fully realizes public opinion can determine or terminate the next phase of his mission.


Despite attempts by both sides to educate themselves on one another, there is still room for cooperation. Non-cooperation from the media can only lead to non-access in future military operations. The military's need for the media may not be as apparent, but the American people have the right to know what its military is doing, barring any operational security issues. Additionally, the military needs to get recognition for the job it does. It is the job of the media to fulfill these two goals.

Today's operational commander has become keenly aware of the media impact on their mission. As Public Affairs has stepped fully into the operational arena, its influence as a force multiplier is being felt. In addition to keeping the public informed, it has proven to be multi-faceted tool in the areas of maintaining public support, operational deception and intelligence gathering.

APPENDIX I



JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU WIRING DIAGRAM



EuCom Public Affairs JIB for Operation *Desert Shield/Storm*

NOTES

- 1 Stephen Aubin, "The Media Impact on the Battlefield," Strategic Review, Winter 1992, 56.
- 2 Winant Sidle, "A Battle Behind the Scenes: The Gulf War Reheats Military-Media Controversy," Military Review, September 1991, 55.
- 3 Jerry W. Friedheim, "How the Public Can Win the Military-Media Battle," Editor & Publisher, April 1992, 41.
- 4 Sidle, 61.
- 5 Aubin, 58.
- 6 *ibid.*, 60.
- 7 Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America's Team, the Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military (Nashville: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 29.
- 8 Mike Sherman, "Informing Through the JIB," Proceedings, August 1991, 60.
- 9 Gordon I. Peterson, "Joint Operations from a PA Perspective," Public Affairs Communicator, May/June 1992, 4.
- 10 *ibid.*, 8.
- 11 *ibid.*, 9.
- 12 General Colin L. Powell (Ret), speech untitled, presented to the Association of the United States Army Marshall Dinner at the Sheraton Washington Ballroom, 19 October 1994.
- 13 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.
- 14 John M. Shotwell, "The Fourth Estate as a Force Multiplier," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, 71.
- 15 Milan Vego, "Operational Synchronization," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1996, 5.
- 16 Aukofer and Lawrence, 56.

¹⁷ Alan D Campen, "Information, Truth and War," The First Information War, ed. Alan D Campen (Fairfax, VA: AFEA International Press, 1982), 86.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Angelle, Alexander. "US Armed Forces Public Affairs: Roles in Low Intensity Conflicts," Military Review, January 1990, 50-60.

Aubin, Stephen. "The Media's Impact on the Battlefield," Strategic Review, Winter 1992, 55-61.

Aukofer, Frank and William P. Lawrence, America's Team, the Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military. Nashville: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995.

Bridges, Richard M. "The Military, the Media and the Next Conflict: Have We Learned Our Lesson?" Army, August 1995, 29-39.

Critz, M.R. "Operational Deception." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. 1996

Crumm, Roberta. "Information Warfare: An Air Force Policy for the Role of Public Affairs," Unpublished Research Paper, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 1996.

Friedheim, Jerry W. "How can the Public Win the Military-Media Battle," Editor and Publisher, April 1992, 45.

Hiebert, Ray E. "Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern Warfare," Public Relations Review, Summer 1991, 107-116.

Lefever, Ernest W., TV and National Defense. Boston, VA: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974.

Lorenz, Frederick and Anthony Zinni. "Media Relations: A Commander's Perspective." Marine Corps Gazette, December 1995, 67-72.

Mathews, Joseph J., Reporting the Wars. Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press, 1957.

Metcalf III, Joseph. "The Mother of the Mother," Proceedings, August 1991, 56-58.

Neuman, Johanna, Lights, Camera, War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Patullo, E.L. "War and the American Press," Parameters, Winter 1992-93, 61-69.

- Peterson, Gordon, "Joint Operations From a PA Perspective," Public Affairs Communicator, May/June 1992, 1-12.
- Sherman, Mike, "Informing Through the JIB," Proceedings, August 1991, 59-61.
- Shotwell, John M. "The Fourth Estate as a Force Multiplier," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, 71-79.
- Sidle, Winant, "A Battle Behind the Scenes: The Gulf War Reheats Military-Media Controversy," Military Review, September 1991, 52-63.
- Stoler, Peter, The War Against the Press. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1986.
- Stein, M.L., Under Fire: The Story of American War Correspondents. New York: Julian Messner, 1968
- U.S. Dept. of Defense. Review of Panama Pool Deployment: December 1989. Washington: 1990.
- U.S. Dept. of Defense. Joint Public Affairs Operations. DODINST 5400.13. Washington: 1996.
- U.S. Dept. of Defense. Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations. DODINST 5400.14. Washington: 1996.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace. Washington: 1995.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Washington: 1995
- Vego, Milan. "Operational Synchronization." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1996.
- _____. "Operational Leadership." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1996